Preface

Akira INOUE*

*Graduate School of Core Ethics and Frontier Sciences, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan

This special issue mainly focuses on questions of global justice and ethics. Since Thomas Pogge's canonical work, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (first edition, 2002; second edition, 2008), was published, global justice and ethics have become important issues in political philosophy, that are mainly concerned with how conceptions of justice and morality can be applied to global poverty. Pogge's famous and powerful argument, which demonstrates that the existing international order is so severely unjust that the wealthy nations (including Japan) cannot avoid fulfilling a negative duty to save the global poor through correcting the intuitional scheme such as a Global Resource Dividend (GRD), is undoubtedly a starting point for most philosophical discussions about global justice and ethics. This is true of two essays contributed to this special issue.

In the first essay, Akira Abe argues that Richard Rorty's argument on global ethics can be employed in order to solve the problem of distance in global justice. Abe argues in line with Rorty that moral sentiment plays an essential role in extending our solidarity with distant and different others. However, since our capacity for sympathy is cognitively and psychologically limited, a duty owed to the global poor may not fully be guaranteed by the extension of our sympathetic concern for distant and different others. By an appeal to Christopher Voparil's contention, Abe emphasizes the importance of turning our attention to the reality of suffering rather than to the possibility of extended loyalty. The fact that people in distant locations are suffering motivates us to urgently deal with their painful situation in some way or other. Abe contends that this is key to overcoming the emotional distance between the rich and the poor.

The second essay by Shinji Murakami purports to show a complementarity between capabilities and resources in designing distributive rules in the (global) institutions. As is well known, there has been long-lasting discussion over the metric of justice and equality; capabilities and resources are the most powerful candidates for such metric. While Amartya Sen and his followers favor the former in ways that attend to a radical diversity of capabilities to convert resources into welfare, or, more precisely, welfare to freely achieve, Pogge defends a resourcist approach that can reasonably

recognize the difference in a person's mental and physical capacities because of their socially shaped characteristics. Although Murakami takes the side of the capability approach at the fundamental level, he admits that in evaluating effective distributive rules, we cannot ignore the following difficulty in using capabilities as a metric of global justice: while the capability approach can reflect people's different capacities of enjoying resources, it may involve the extremely complex process of evaluating information concerning them. With this in mind, Murakami proposes the two-layered distributive rules: the first-layered rule, which is sensitive to people's pursing various goals of their own lives, depends upon the GRD, whereas the second-layered rule, which is sensitive to a more basic level of people's lives, is endorsed by the capability approach. This two-layered setting is, Murakami contends, more plausible than the GRD, because while it is feasible in virtue of the two-layered system, it is more sensitive to a variety of people's basic needs.

***

These two essays convince us that Thomas Pogge's argument developed in *World Poverty and Human Rights* is not just influential, but also essentially important in constructing rigorous theories of global justice and ethics. The translation of its second edition into Japanese (published in 2010) is a major contribution to the field of global justice and ethics in Japan. Shinya Tateiwa, who is a supervisor of the translation project, will contribute a critical notice of Pogge's book to the next issue.